One of the central objectives of studying database privacy protection is to protect sensitive information held in a database from being inferred by a generic database user. In this paper, we present a framework to assist in the formal analysis of the database inference problem. The framework is based on an association network which is composed of a similarity measure and a Bayesian network model.
INTRODUCTION
As the information explosion has grown, so has the trend of data sharing and information exchange also grown. Accordingly, privacy concerns have reached a critical level [13] . In his report [1] , Anderson stated that the combination of birth date and post code (zip code) with data from a health database is sufficient to identify 98% of the UK population! It is certainly a concern for the Icelandic patients' database [11] . Many existing efforts (e.g., [10] [11]) have been geared towards the hiding of stored data items and access control. It has been shown that even if the sensitive personal information is hidden, it can be derived from publicly accessible data by means of inference [2] [5] [14] [15] [16] [17] [21] [22] . Denning [6] categorized several different types of attacks and analyzed the protection methods where query returns are statistical quantities (e.g., mean, variance). Hinke's work on deterministically chained related attributes shows how the information can be obtained from non-obvious links [9] . Duncan [5] [22] presented cell suppression techniques where the marginal probability distributions are preserved by disturbing the probability mass of component variables. Sweeney's work applies the aggregation operation to the merge of the attribute values [20] .
We wish to put the inference problem upon a firm theoretical foundation. The main contribution of this paper is to categorize and discuss inference from different perspectives and represent those different views in a coherent framework. Among the above mentioned approaches, ours and [5] are similar in that both attempt to minimize the information loss for a database user. The difference is that our protection method evaluates values of each data item. At the core of our model a structured representation of probabilistic dependency among attributes is adopted.
Summarizing from previous work, we envision two perspectives of inference characterized by attribute properties. One perspective is about the probabilistic correlation among attributes. A complimentary perspective is that of individuality which emphasizes the uniqueness of each individual data item. For the former, a Bayesian network [18] can be used to model correlation relationships among attributes. Let attributes whose information we wish to protect be the target attributes. Based on this model, one can evaluate the potential impact that impinges upon a target attribute from information about other attributes, and decide the pertinent protection strategies accordingly. Although the probabilistic method is useful in describing the likelihood of the occurrence of an attribute value, it may be ineffective for identifying which attribute value is unique to a data item. This uniqueness can be deemed as the individuality of a data item. To protect such an attribute value, it is necessary to determine whether other attribute values, or their combinations, provide the same amount of information as the special one does to the data item. Thus, the identification of individuality is separate from the probabilistic correlation analysis. The proposed framework is the first to integrate these two perspectives.
POLICY
We use data modification to ensure high privacy protection. Our concerns are that a user (authorized for limited data access) might be able to combine his/her information with other users, or to simply generate inferences on his/her own, to glean knowledge about data that they should not have access to. Of course we are not concerned with the data originator learning this information. Our privacy policy can be phrased as follows:
• No sensitive information can be inferred from publicly released data.
• No false information is added to the database to increase privacy protection. Of course we are still allowing ourselves to hide data to increase privacy protection ---we are only disallowing erroneous data. Since protection always involves a certain level of modification to the data, some statistical properties of a database will inevitably be affected ---this is good for privacy concerns but bad for functionality. Our proposed model will incorporate dynamic changes as a result of new attributes being added and new data being collected.
INFERENCE
What information needs to be protected in a database? Consider the example medical database as shown in Table 1 , where attributes "address", "age" and "occupation" are the basic personal information, and "hepatitis", "mental depression", "AIDS" and "thyroid (function)" are the personal medical records. It is certain information about the unique user identification number "uid" that we wish to protect (AIDS, suicide, etc. 
Identification of Similar Attributes
To prevent inference attacks, information such as a person's name should automatically be removed from the database. However, the removal of the name attribute is hardly adequate. Other attributes, such as a person's address, may reveal essentially the same information and thus, should also be hidden from general users. Consider two attributes in a database and the natural relation given between their attribute values. If this relation is "close" to being a bijection then we say that the attributes are similar. In Table 2 we see the relation between "uid" and "address". If one "uid" corresponds to one "address" value, then "address" is congruent to "uid", this is not the case.
However, the mapping between the two is almost a bijection so they are similar (only three addresses correspond to more than one uid, and in those cases they correspond to two uids). Intuitively, the less the spread of the frequency count shown in the table, the higher the similarity between the target and the candidate attributes. The criterion of determining which attributes are similar to the target attribute is quantified in terms of our information theoretical rule.
where N and M stand for the number of attribute values of the target attribute T (with values tj) and candidate attribute C (with values ci), respectively. Vi is the dispersion measure of the ith attribute value of C, and V gives the total dispersion measure with normalization. A low V score is the selection criteria for similar. Similar attributes are the ones that we want to modify because they give us inference about the target attribute. In terms of the frequentist's view, we have Pr(tj|ci)=nij/ni, where nij denotes the frequency count at the ith row and jth column, and ni is the sum of the ith row. Note that the range of this dispersion measure is from 0 to logN. The minimum occurs when only one entry in each row has a non-zero value. The maximum happens when the mass ni is evenly distributed over ALL attribute values of T. Given that T="uid" the V-score for C="address" (Table 2 ) is 3/17=0.18. Note that if the V-score of a candidate attribute C is less than 1, then there exists Vi-scores of C that are equal to 0, for some i. Attribute values that correspond to low Vi-scores are subject to modification.
A candidate attribute can be a combination of several attributes. For instance, the combination of "address" and "mental depression" can uniquely identify each item in the Table 1 . Figure 1 shows such a combination. The fact is that a merge of several attributes with high V-scores can yield a low V-score. Using V-scores an indicator, the proposed search evaluates possible combinations of different attributes until a bijection with the target attribute is reached, or a desired V-score is reached. Attributes or their combination with low Vscores are stored. 
Computation of Probabilistic Impact
The analysis of the probabilistic dependency is based on a Bayesian net representation ([8] [18] ). As shown in Figure 2 , either "AIDS" or "thyroid" leads to "mental depression", while "hepatitis" and "mental depression" support the diagnosis of "AIDS". Thus, "AIDS" can be inferred from information about "hepatitis" and "mental depression". Note that attributes about a person's background are not included in this figure because of the low statistical significance due to their large sets of attribute values. As mentioned earlier, the combination of "address" and "mental depression" will lead to the identification of "uid". Thus, one may able to infer about whether a particular person contracts AIDS by joining together the information from Figure 1 and Figure 2 . The joined network is shown in Figure 3 . To prevent the potential association of "uid" and "AIDS", information, in particular, "mental depression" (since it contributes to both networks) must be reduced. To protect sensitive information, strategies of blocking and aggregation are used. 
INFORMATION REDUCTION
In this paper, we consider the database modification strategies of blocking and merging. The purpose of modification is to mitigate database inference.
Reduction range
To give an objective quantitative description of the extent to which users are willing to tolerate the potential error induced from database modification, we invoke a quality index (QI) of a database. QI is generated during the data collection phase. It is represented as the logarithm (base 2) of the sample probability in our analysis:
where D denotes the data set and m denotes a model. If m is a Bayesian network model Bn then QI will be log Pr(D|Bn). QI is viewed as the lower bound of the level of tolerance, below which the validity of inference drawn from the modified database is in doubt. The operation range is defined in terms of the rate of change, γ.
Definition 3. (Ratio of Reduction) γ ≡ |QI_{original} -QI_{modified}| / |QI_{original}|
For instance, if the original QI is -60 and the QI of the modified database is -63, then the allowed rate of change, γ, is 5%. Our assumption is that the estimated inherent error in the original data and the tolerance measure of how much we are allowed to perturb the data are tied together in some underlying basic manner.
Blocking
The approach of blocking is implemented by replacing certain attribute values of some data items with a question mark ---this indicates total ignorance of the preference [2] . The set of attribute values that maximally change the posterior probability of the desired target value Pr(T=tj|Dm,Bn), with respect to the modified database Dm and the given Bn, are chosen for blocking. If the modification can cause drastic change to the present belief, it should be considered for hiding. The modification will stop when the change reaches beyond the specified γ.
Claim 1.
The QI, log(Pr(D|Bn)), is monotonically decreasing as more attribute values are blocked.
As an example, let the allowed rate of change γ be 3%. From Table 1 , the 3% change of QI whose value changes from log(Pr(D|Bn))=-38.85 to log(Pr(Dm|Bn))=-40 can be best achieved by modifying Data item 3: "hepatitis" = "y" as well as Data item 4: "mental depression" ="dep". The result of the released database is shown in Table 3 . Since modification inevitably weakens the probabilistic dependency, it may lead to the change of network topology Bn. Thus, the causal dependency of the target also needs to be re-evaluated. Table 3 : medical records released to generic users hepatitis n y ? y y n y y y n n y n y n n n y n y mental n l l l n n n l l n l n n l l n l n l n
Aggregation
We apply an aggregation operation [17] for combining different values of an attribute of low Vi-score. Aggregation may be done according to the known taxonomic structure imposed on attribute values (e.g., home address with respect to zip code). One example is shown in Table 4 , where home addresses of Table  1 are merged into larger districts lexicographically. [7] and therefore, increases the statistical significance [4] . For the number of attribute values changing from 17 to 6, the threshold of the confidence region is given by a finite number that is 11.1 with the confidence level 0.95 based on chi-square estimation. In the absence of such structure, the concept clustering method with clustering criterion based on Pr(Bn|Dm) will be used as the selection criterion.
ASSOCIATION NETWORK
As discussed, different data analysis methods are used in light of the different statistical properties of attributes. We integrate the similarity relation and its related taxonomy structure [18] with probabilistic causal (Bayesian) to form what we call an association network as in Figure 4 . It provides the basis for privacy protection analysis. We envision the following steps for generation.
• Conduct the similarity selection and Bayesian network induction. Attributes with low V-score will have their values be either aggregated to increase significance level or replaced with pseudo-code.
• Evaluate impact on target attributes from other attributes in association networks.
• Modify attribute values according to a calculated priority.
• After modification, (randomly) check if other combinations still violate the privacy protection criterion. 
Restoration
It is possible to (partially) restore hidden attribute values if the information of the underlying Bayesian network structures of the database are known -this is the worst case to defend against.
As in [2][8] [12] , the restoration approach primarily selects the set of instantiation x to the hidden values with respect to log Pr(Dm{x}|Bn) for Dm. With data of Table 3 , one could obtain the values of "AIDS" shown in Table 5 . Note that the two blockings (i.e., data items 3 and 4) are also correctly restored to their original states. Table 5 : restored medical records hepatitis n y y y y n y y y n n y n y n n n y n y mental
n y y y n n n y y n y n n y y n n y n n thyroid n l l l n n n l l n l n n l l n l n l n Changes of the "AIDS" values occur in three placesa reasonably good guess, but a bad outcome for privacy protection. If the number of blockings increases to 4 with "mental depression" of data items 3, 8, 14 and 18 being blocked, the restoration is disrupted. The result is shown in Table 6 , where changes in the restored values of "AIDS" increase to seven, a fairly random outcome. In general, to ensure no restoration, one needs to modify associated causes and evaluate their ramifications [3] . We will consider the combined strategy with respect to the constraint . Table 6 : restored from more blocking hepatitis n y y y y n y y y n n y n y n n n y n y mental n d ? d d n n ? d n d n n ? d n d ? d n AIDS n y n y n n n n y n y n n n y n n n n n thyroid n l l l n n n l l n l n n l l n l n l n
Effectiveness Evaluation
The result of blocking will push the target probability toward the uniform distribution. In fact, This property is in tune with our intuition that uniformity gives maximal entropy, while specificity gives minimal entropy. The evaluation of the effectiveness of modification in our framework is carried out by cross-validation over Dm where effectiveness is measured in terms of the error rate Ucf(e,s) [19] , meaning the chance of having e errors with s test data at the confidence level cf. For instance, in Table 3 , with 3 misclassified test data and 7 test data, the predicted error rate, Ucf (3, 7) , is 0.43 at cf=10%. The result means that if the error rate is high, the network model is unreliable and thus, the inference is mitigated.
CONCLUSION
Our results suggest that database privacy protection requires extensive evaluation and analysis of data relationships. Our model requires two-tier processing. First, a similarity analysis is carried out for examining similar attributes.
The second tier is based on the probabilistic dependency analysis of attributes. Blocking and aggregation are used to prevent inference. Inference is analyzed with an association network, which consists of the probabilistic dependency structure, the taxonomy structure and the similarity measure. This provides a unified framework for database inference analysis.
